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ABSTRACT
In this paper we look at some empirical evIdence of and theoretIcal
rationale for price inflexibility in the face of a decrease in short run demand
in the Western—type industrialized economies. The empirical evidencesuggests
that price sluggishness is pervasive but varies across markets, industries and
countries. There are different reasons for the price inertia. Therespon8e of
firms to uncertainty, the cost of adjusting prices, the contents of thelong—
term contracts In the goods and Input markets, the extent and variability of
excess demand may differ among firms and industries. The structure of the
industry, the degree of heterogeneity of the products In a market, the network
of input—output relationship among industries, the nature of Internationalcom-
petition, the process of forming expectations about the future,shocks from mone-
tary and fiscal policies and input price shocks, all interact and create the
ever changing environment of the firms. In these changing circumstances there
are incentives for prices to be sluggish and thus arises the dilemma of
achieving price stability at a high cost of unemployment. The ability of
governments to achieve stable prices is probably endogenous in the system and
may depend on a threshhold rate of inflation. A number of policy options are
discussed to address the issue of price inertia which would reduce the adjust-
ment burden of anti—inflationary policies.
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Introduction
TIie phenomenon of price insensitivity to changes in demand inthe
advanced Western economies has been a subject of considerablediscussion
among macro—economists and policy makers. In recent years prices have not
only been rigid downward but even have risen in the face of slack demand.
Short—run inflexibility of prices is critical for thesuccess of fiscal and
monetary stabilization policies and ability of the economic systems to
accommodate external shocks. The question is whatare the causes of price
inflexibility and is it consistent with private maximizationprinciples.
How the dynamic interactions among variousstages and types of economic
activity lead to price stickiness of the aggregate price level?
The debate on aggregate price adjustment has beenjoined by two
schools of thought: the neo—Keynesian approach whichassumes that markets
do not clear because of institutional and informationalarrangements and
the "new classical" equilibrium approach to businesscycle which postulates
market clearance and instantaneous prices adjustment inresponse to changes
in nominal demand. The empirical evidence,as shown by Gordon [1982aJ and
others is that prices are neither perfectly fixednor perfectly flexibile;
they vary over time and across industries, markets, and countries.Neither
of the two approaches seem as of yet to providea consistent explanation of
this empiricaL finding. This has led to a search fordeveloping the micro
foundations for price rigidity from an optimizationviewpoint and models
which explicitly take account of the structure of marketsand input—output
relationships in the economy. As of yet there is no generalconsensus—3--
model available to explain the observed degree and pervasiveness of price
inil exihiI ity.
Inthis paper our purpose is to sketch some illustrative empirical
findings on price adjustment at the aggregate and industry levels in some
of the Western industrialized economies and to discuss some of the micro
economic models of price adjustment that have been proposed. The second
objective of the paper is to examine the relationship of market structure
and pricing behavior and assemble some of the evidence on differential
price behavior in competitive and oligopolistic markets. The third issue
considered is how these differential price behaviors may lead to the price
adjustment observed at the aggregate economy level. The paper is concluded
with a few final remarks and policy suggestions.
I. The Extent and Degree of Price Inflexibility
The empirical evidence on the question of price vs. output flexibility
has been quite extensive. The evidence comes partly from macro econometric
studies, survey of transactions in different markets and studies of
disaggregated price series. We shall briefly discuss each of these type of
evidence before examining some of the theoretical rationale provided for
the phenomenon of price inertia in the context of profit maximizing models.
1.Evidence from Macro Price Models
R. J. Gordon [1982a] has been one of the leading persons in the U.S.
who has addressed empirically the question of price inertia in aggregate
price level. His results indicate that nominal GNP has been divided con-
sistently over the last 90 years of U.S. history about two thirds taking—4—
the form of output changes and theremaining one third the form of price
changes; the structure of price expectations has changedsome time before
the World War lifrom a regressive to anextrapolative form possibly due to
the recognition of the stabilizing role ofgovernment policies and the
emergence of overlapping wage contracts in the U.S. However, when the
experience of the U.S. economy is compared to that ofJapan and the U.K.,
Gordon finds that the wage and prices aremore flexible in the latter
countries. The degree of price inflexibility thereforevaries among
countries and overtime. Nonetheless, the evidence ofprice inertia par-
ticularly in the postwar U.S. economy suggests a sluggishresponse of pri-
ces to restrictive demand policies and the resultinghigh unemployment,
thus constituting a dilemma for policy makers.
Evidence of price inflexibility in thepostwar U.S. economy and the
European economies has been reported by other studiesas well. Otto
Eckstein and G. Fromm [1968] using U.S. annual datafound that both prices
and outputs react within three to six monthsto changes in costs and
demand. George Hay [1970] found for two U.S.industries that a temporary
increase in demand caused a small increase inprice but a large increase in
output. de Minel [1974] using aggregate data for the U.S.reached similar
conclusions. The evidence provided for the nineteenOECD countries by D.
Grubb, R. Jackman and R. Layard [1982] suggests differentdegrees of price
and wage Inertia in these countriesover the postwar period. Coutts,
Godley and Nordhaus [1978] using British data for severalindustries
reached the conclusion that prices aremainly determined by costs and
affected little by changes in demand. Studiesusing time series data for—5—
Germany found that firms keep their prices at their plannedlevel and
adjust their outputs when demand changes [Kawasaki,McMillan and Zimmerman
[1983]J. The econometric results obtained by Nadiri and Gupta [19771and
Eckstein—Wyss [1977] for different U.S. manufacturing industries provides
evidence of price inertia at the industry level. These results indicate
that effects of demand changes on prices are small in most of the
industries considered and there is evidence of considerable inertia in
price adjustments. The degree of demand effect and price adjustment,
however, varies amongindustries.
The studies differ in their coverage, level of aggregation and span
of time. However, they all seem to point to the slow adjustment of prices
and more rapid adjustment of outputs when the demand level changes in the
short run. But a potential shortcoming of all these studies is that they
are based not on transaction but list prices. George Stigler and J.
Kindahl [1970] have argued that the relevant series is prices at which
buyers and sellers transact a sale. They have indicated based on their
study that transaction prices are highly variable and the price stickiness
reported above may be an illusion. However, as'Welss [1977] has argued
persuasively that changes in Stigler—Kindahi price series and BLS data
(which is often used in studies mentioned above) reflect each other and
therefore the Stigler—Kendall conclusion is not valid. Further new econo-
metric studies using transaction prices indicate that firms in their imme-
diate response to disequilibrium, are more likely to react immediately with
an output change than a price change.—6—
2. Survey of Market Transactions
Another source of evidence of whether pricesare inflexible is pro-
vided in an interesting study by Canton [1979].Tables 1 and 2 provide
evidence on the pattern of transactions prices ina sample of businesses
during a relatively non—inflationary period 1957—66. Table1 lists by pro-
duct the average duration of priceinflexibility in months and the standard
deviation of duration. The resultssuggest several important points: For
many transactions between individual buyers and sellers, priceonce set
tends to remain unchanged for a substantialperiod of time. This suggests
that quantity adjustment and not pricesmay be the mechanism used to allo-
cate some goods when supply or demand changes. Since thestandard
deviation of length of price rigidity is quitehigh we can infer that a
wide variety of contracts have differingprice flexibility; i.e., some
contracts with very flexible prices while others withvery inflexible pri-
ces for the same broad commodity group. Finally, thereare very large dif-
ferences across industries in degree of priceinflexibility.
The results in table 2 show the frequency ofprice rigidity by the
duration of contract i.e., annual andmonthly. it seems that the
contracting structure for each product is not only different but thereare
many annualcontractswhose prices change well before oneyear is elapsed
while there are many monthly contracts whoseprices often do not change for
one year. Thus the contract terms seem to bevery flexible and adaptable
to changes in market condition. Perhapsongoing relations between buyer
and selLer account for this behavior. Also themonthly contract prices
vary more frequently than those for the annual contracts whichimplies that—7—
there are contracts whose prices remain unchanged at the same time that
demand and supply forces are changing other contract prices for the same
commodity group.
From these results it is likely to draw the conjecture that markets
resemble liquid markets with flexible prices performing the allocative role
and markets which resemble illiqiild markets with fixed prices and quantity
allocations performing the ailocative role. Nonferrous metal, petroleum
and plywood are likely to have submarkets that are highly liquid while
steel, paper and chemicals seem likely to have submarkets that are highly
illiquid. For some goods highly liquid and illiquid submarkets may exist
as well. These observations suggest there are different degreesof price
inflexibility in different markets and for different products which are
likely to change over time and among different industries.
An econometric study using monthly transaction prices and output
changes of individual firms in various German industries substantiates the
results noted above and confirms the hypothesis of differentiated behavior
in different markets. Kawasaki et al [19821 develop a dynamic dise-
quilibrium model taking account of inventories and unfilled orders in
determining the adjustment path of prices and output in response to changes
In demand.Theirresults show that both prices and output flexibility vary
markedly across industries reflecting some of differences among industries
noted above. They show that prices are in the short—run inflexible in
industries such as stone and clay machinery; electrical equipment, iron,
tin and other products, glass and products and clothing. While nonferrous
metals, textiles, plastic and products exhibit short—run price flexibility.—8—
The results also indicate that each firmchanges its output whenever there
is an inventory or unfilled order disequilibriumbut changes its price only
when disequilibrium persists longenough to reflect permanent changes in
demand or costs. However, there is no evidence ofasymmetry in their price
behavior i.e., prices are no less flexible downwardsthan upward. When
firms face high level of inventories,they are just as likely to cut their
prices as they are to raise their prices when inventoriesare too low.
3 EvIdence from Disaggregated Prices Studies
The most thorough study of behavior ofprices during periods of
recession has been published by Cagan [1975].Using approximately iioo BLS
wholesale price series for 1947—70, he demonstratedthat in each succeeding
recession since World War II there was atendency for a smaller average
decline in prices. The pattern isespecially clear when the rate of price
change in a recession is regarded as a decline from therate of price
increase in the immediately preceding
expansion. The importantquestion is
whether the distribution of recession rates ofprice change differs between
classes of industries with different levels ofconcentration ratio.
Cagan's results are unequivocal for all recessionsexcept the 1969—70
period. The average decrease in the rate ofprice change has been greater
for less concentrated industries. In the1969—70 recession the average
price of the high concentration group increased lessthan the mean price of
the intermediate group, but bothaverage rates increased, whereas the
average rate for the least concentrated group declinedrelatively to the
preceding expansion.—9--.
There are two principal points to be noted in connectionwith Cagan's
study:
1)The responsiveness of all prices to recessions declined duringthe
post World War 11 period.
2) The prices in less concentrated industries were more responsive
than the prices in more concentrated industries.
The evidence seems to favor the view that all prices have becomeless
responsive to decline in aggregate demand. Also Wachteland Adeisheim's
[1977] results imply that, even if cost changes are takeninto account, the
concLusion reached by Cagan onthegrowing downward inflexibility of prices
in successive recessions is reaffirmed.
An examination of the empirical evidence of other disaggregated stu-
dies suggest several important conclusions:
1. Factor costs such as wage rates and material prices arethe domi-
nant determinants of industry price changes. The importance of
factor costs is overwhelmingly supported by cross—sectional and
time—series studies. This finding is consistent with studies of
aggregate price behavior.
2. Prices are generally much less sensitive to demand changesthan to
cost changes.— 1()—
3.Pricing behavior is related to the level of industry con-
centration. Although costs are important determinants ofprices
in all industries, the influence of demand variesconsiderably
among industries. Short—run demand changes have an effect on
price changes in the competitive industries. Incontrast,
long—run trend of aggregate demand influences prices inmore con-
centrated industries. This implies that short—run declinein
demand can be expected to have minimal effecton many industry
prices. This finding of disaggregate studiesmay explain why the
demand variable has been often foundinsignificant in aggregate
price equations.
4. Prices are often perversely affectedby a decline in demand, that
is, a type of compensatory pricing behaviorseems to have occurred
in some industries.
5. An important conclusion is that the structureof the economy has
changed in the 1960's toward domination of costson prices. This
is manifested in the upward shift in thedistribution of price
changes; there is less downward flexibility ofprices in
recessions. In the most recent recessions wholesaleprices have
not generally fallen.
From the evidence presented here it seems thatprlcs are subject to
•sl'igglsh adjustment En the postwar period. Unever, thedegree andper-
vasiveness of price adjustment vary considerablyover time, markets,— 11—
industriesandcountries.Theresponseto a change in demand in the short—
run, however,is mainlyto adjust output and to a much smaller extent pri-
ces. The questions that arise are:Whysuchasymmetry in response of
prices and quantitities in majority of industries?Whether the market
structure such as the degree of concentration has some relationshipwith
price inflexibility? And how the various degreesof price Inflexibility in
different markets, for whatever reason, may led to aggregate pricelevel
inflexibility?These aresome of the questions we shall attempt to address
below.
Section II. The Theoretical Rationale for Price Inflexibility
There are varieties of theoretical rationale for firms tobe reluctant
to change their prices in face of a short term changein demand. If firms
are interested in long term profits they may equatetheir long term margi-
nal revenue to long term marginal cost and then prices may becomeinvarient
to changes in the short run. If firms are producing multiple outputthey
willface the problem of jointly setting pricesfor all of their product.
Thecost associated with price adjustments may induce thefirms to have
astable price policy even if the demand for the individual productfluc-
tuates. Firms may be interested in goals otherthan profit maximization
such as increasing market share, stable profit margin or targetrate of
return on investment.Insuch a case firms may want to change their prices
infrequently. It is impossible to present allthe theoretical arguments
andevidence for whyprices are inflexible. We shall discuss some of the
maintheoretical models put forward to rationalize why price inertia may
arisefrom an optimizing behavior.— 12—
1.Industrial Structure and Price Behavior
One of the most important structural features of theWestern
industrial economies is the difference between individualindustries in the
extent to which particular markets are dominatedby one or a few large
sellers. The traditional view has reliedon the difference in the discre-
tionary power over the price as the main explanation of thedifferences in
the pricing behavior between oligopolistic andcompetitive industries.
Thus prices in competitive markets aresupposed to arise out of interaction
between market demand and supply, whereasprices in oligopolistic
industries are set by some implicit collusiveagreement between few oligo—
polistic firms dominating the industry.
The notion of differential price behavior inconcentrated and uncon—
centrated industries was first raised by Gardiner Means[19621. He
advanced the "administered price" thesis,i.e., administrative control over
prices in markets where there are relatively small numbersof firms results
in less price flexibility than is found inmore competitive markets:
prices in concentrated industries tend to fall less thancompetitive prices
during periods of recession and to rise less than themarket determined
prices during expansionary periods.
Studies attempting to verify or reject Means'hypothesis have been
basically empirical with little theoretical explanation ofthe process
underlying the differential pricing behavior of theconcentrated and uncon—
centrated industries. The usual criticism of thetraditional view has
centered on the lack of explicit price determinationmechanism in both
types of industries. In the absence of Walrasian actioneer itis not clear— 13—
howpricesin the competitive markets are in fact "made" as a resultof
interaction of supply and demand. On the other hand, theoriesof oligopo—
listic pricing have been generally ad—hoc and lack rigoroustheoretical
foundations [Frydman and Nadiri (1978)1. However, recentstudies have
clarified to some extent the basic issues involved and has led to a more
sophisticated understanding of the possible relationshipbetween industrial
structure and pricing behavior.
Phelps and Winter [19701 have developed an atomistic competitionmade
of price behavior. In a significant departure from traditional analysis
the authors assume that each atomistic firmisin a position of a transient
monopolist and it is a price setter. Due to imperfect and costlyinfor-
mation as to the currently set prices, the result will be not one pricein
the competitive market, but a distribution of prices. Thus, each firmwill
not lose its customers instantaneously when it raises its priceabove the
average of competitors' prices and will also not attract asubstantial
number of customers at the instant in which it lowers its prices below the
average of market prices. The firm will fix its price accordingto stan-
dard theory of price settings under monopoly conditions with the signifi-
cant difference that it will have to take explicitly into account the cost
of setting the price which is different than the mean industry price. The
Phelps—Winter model replaces the fiction of Wairasian actioneer with expli-
cit account of price setting under conditions of atomistic competition.
The recent advance in theory of disequilibrium pricing suggested by F.
Fisher [1981] and others also substantiates the rationale of inertia or
relative inflexibility of prices in the competitive industries.— 14—
Fromthe point of view of our discussion the importance of the
Phelps—Winter model lies in the apparent blurring of the distinctionsbet-
ween oligopolistic and competitive pricing behavior. The differential
pricing behavior is dependent on the degree of response of rivals. Whatis
important to note is the information aspects of pricesetting that underlie
price formation inalimarkets [Frydman and Nadiri (1978)].This,
however, does not lead to the conclusion that prices in oligopoliticand
competitive industries are set in the same way. The crucial difference
lies in the likelihood of collusionamong firms in a given industry. G.
Stigler [19641 has argued that when the number of sellers islower, the
ability to detect price cutters is much stronger and a collusiveagreement
easier to maintain. This argument provides an essentiallink between the
likelihood of collusion among firms and degree ofindustry concentration.
Recently Phlips [1980] has derived a price rule which linksprice behavior
to the parameters representing market structure,degree of cooperation
among firms and the possibility of entry. It is shown that pricerigidi-
ties can result from an intertemporaloptimizing behavior. The optimal
path of the firms price rule is obtained from an intertemporalprice
discrimination model where firms accumulate inventoriesand the possibility
of entry of exist. The industry price equation takes thefollowing form:
m- 5mh P P =(—) a+(—)— (—) — — m+S m+tS m+Sp q
where cSreflectsthe degree of cooperation among firms In theindustry, m
Is the number of firms, a is the slope of the linearindustry demand sche—— 15—
dule,k is the average normalized marginal cost, while Pls the
p
average cost (or loss of profit) due to entry. It is likelythat the
degree of cooperationwill depend on the degree of concentration, m.
Also barrier to entry represented by h P should have a positive effect
p Q
onindustry price and the better the cooperation among firms (for given m)
the larger cS and the stronger is the negative impact of the threat of entry
on price. Other implications of this model are: In more concentrated
industries costs increases are less fully transmitted into prices than In
less concentrated industries; changes in demand are transmitted more fully
into prices in concentrated industries than in more competitive industries;
for a given industry structure an increase in industry demand will have
smalIer lmpact onjrices than an increaseinaverage marginal normaLized
costs. These are testable hypothesis and Phlips' empirical results for a
select group of industries in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France confirm
them. Particularly costs turn out to be the dominant factors affecting
prices in different catagories of industries and the barrier to entry has a
highly significant positive effect on prices.
An important question is to substantiate whether there is a link bet-
ween the likelihood of collusion among firm and the degree of Industry con-
centration. We noted Stigler's [19641 argument in favor of this
propostion. However, to establish Its validity, it is important to show
whether collusion among firms leads to higher long term profits. Some
evidence is provided by the studies of the relationship between con—— 16—
centrationand profits. Weiss [19741 concludes on the basis ofextensive
survey of empirical evidence that, "The bulk of the studies show asignifi-
cant positive effect of concentration of profits ormargins." Since impli-
cit cooperation is usually found in concentratedindustries, these findings
imply that collusion seems to be profitable for cooperating firms.
But how does the process work? Ross and Wachter [1975]provide an
explanation for an observation that firms in oligopolistic Industriesact
so as to maintain fixed pricing strategies (although notnecessarily or
generally fixed prices), which they alter at regular points of time. The
interval of time in which the pricingstrategy is unchanged is called the
planning period. Thus their model is not an explanation ofprice deter-
mination under oligopoly, but it provides ananalysis of timing of price
changes in concentrated industries. They assume that the firmsare denied
a possibility of outright collusion and that particularequilibrium
industry structure has developed. The implication of thisequilibrium is
that none of the firms or any coalition of firms, boundby the implicit
collusive agreement, views it to be in their interestto alter the
equilibrium structure. As the demand and supply conditions of theindustry
change, in deciding on whether or not to adjust to the newdevelopments,
the firm is forced to balance the loss of profits dueto inappropriate
price structure against the potential profit loss if anattempt to alter
prices should lead to a breakdown in the level ofoligopoly cooperation.
The significance of Ross—Wachter's model lies in Itsapplicability to
a wide variety of market structures. The firms in thecompetitive
industries will repsond continuously to changes in marketconditions, since— 17—
theatoniistlc firms find it impossible to collude and therefore will not
face the trade off between benefits of collusion and losses due to inappro-
priate price structure. On the other hand, the firmsin oligopolistic
industries will move in discrete time intervals. The conclusion regarding
competitive firms should he modified, however, to take accountof the fac-
tors elaborated in the Phelps—Winter model, i.e., informational structure
of the market would cause firms in the competitive markets to respond, also
in dscrete time intervals.
2. Inventory and Price Stickiness
A firm's profit maximizing inventory strategy may also cause the firm
to react differently to a change in demand depending on whether thefirm
perceives the change to be transitory or permanent. The assumptionabout
the demand fluctuation is essential in models which link inventory deci-
sions and price inflexibility. Since demand fluctuates randomly around a
given mean, the firms respond to these fluctuations by changingtheir level
of inventories because they cannot instantaneously adjust their prices or
outputs. The inventory change is followed in the next period by a change
in the rate of production to restore their equilibrium inventory stocks
while leaving their prices unchanged. Kawasaki et al [1983] constructs a
model of dynamic profit maximization under uncertainty and imperfect com-
petition to derive an analogue of repeated Cournot equilibriumframework.
Using such analytical framework they demonstrate that firms changetheir
output in response to demand change but change their prices in response
to only permanent demand changes. A. Blinder [1982] also reachessimilar— 18—
conclusionsthough using a different analytical framework. Thatis, both
prices and output respond less to a transitory demand shockthan to a per-
manent demand change and when output becomes more "inventorable."Prices
will become sticky when inventories can be storedwithout much cost and
when the demand shocks are transitory. In both ofthese models the
existence of inventories reduces the flexibility ofprices In all states of
demand and in both directions. In fact, theempiricial results reported by
Kawasaki et al [1982] as was noted earliersuggest no evidence of asvm—
metrical response of prices, i.e., prices are less flexibledownwards than
upwards.
Note that these models provide an explanation of therelative price
inflexibility and not sluggish absolute prices. However,changes in rela-
tive prices can affect the rate of inflation[see Fischer [19821 J. The
models described here can be modified to relate firmprice decision to their
expectations about aggregate price expectations or demand fluctuation.If
the mean of the firm demand functions stated aboveshifts, a new
equilibrium emerges with each firm having a newtarget Inventory stock and
perhaps a new price. This can arise if firms formexpectations about
future changes in aggregate demand or generalprice levels and use them as
indicators of how the mean of the individual demandfunctions will shift.
This will lead to possibility of linking thesluggishness of relative pri-
ces and absolute prices as shown by J. Rotemberg [1982] andR. J. Gordon
[1981].— 19—
3.Adjustment Costs in Changing Prices
The degree of price infiexbility, in econometric price equations is
measured by the coefficient of lagged price variable. The estimates of
this coefficient imply that firms incur a cost for not being able to change
its price readily. The partial adjustment of prices in these equations are
mainly ad—hoc in the same way as the adjustment lags were postulated in
econometric investment finctEons prior to the advent of the cost of
adjustment models. If the firms know the costs involved in adjusting their
prices in face of a changed demand condition it is logical for them to take
these costs into account in their optimization behavior. The adjustment
costs for changing prices are due to administrative cost of changing the
price lists, etc. and more importantly due to potential unfavorable reac-
tion of consumers to frequent price changes. J. Rotemberg [1982] has deve-
lopedaninterestingeqiifllbrium model ofmonopolisticpriceadjustment
withcostof adjustment of prices explicitly taken into account. The model
is like the Lucas [1972] equilibrium model of business cycle and incor-
porates the Phelps—Winter type of monopolistic pricing behavior. Firms
optimize their objective function taking the prices set by other firms as
given; they make the best full use of the current information i.e., they
form their expectations rationally. The firms produce differentiated pro-
ducts, they observe their demand and cost functions before setting their
prices, they know the prices of their suppliers, the price level and the
level of aggregate nominal money balances. The cost to changing prices is
assumed to be a function of the square of the price change and the monopo-
lists set their prices optimally given that it is costly to change them.— 20—
Rotemhergshows that in the presence of adjustment costschanging prices
today will affect tomorrow's profit and the pricing rule for thefirm will
be the usual partial adjustment equation used inmost empirical studies
i.e.,
+ (1—y)
where in the expectation formed by firm i of itsoptimal price; Pj
depends on the cost of changing prices,say C; and p the discount rate.
When c increases price increases i.e., it will takelonger for current
prices to adjust toward their long run value. The effect ofchanges in p
on speed of adjustment is ambiguous; a decrease inp makes it relatively
cheaper to change prices in the future but it alsopenalizes the monopo-
lists relatively more for current deviations ofactual prices from their
long run values.
If each firm picks its
optimally given the prices charged by other
firms and expects its decision not to influencethe path of aggregate
variables such as the stock ofmoney or the aggregate price level, then
Rotemberg shows that the industry equilibrium can be establishedand an
aggregate price equation analogous to the one stated abovecan be derived,
i.e.,
Pt =Ape_i+ (1—A) P
where Pt is the price level "desired"at t and A is the partial adjustment
coefficient of aggregate price level. Thistype of equation is often— 21—
usedto estimate the aggregate price level [Gordon (1981), Nadirl—Gupta
(1977)]. The virtue of Rotemberg's model is that it derivesthe partial
adjustment price equations for both Individual and aggregate pricesfrom an
optimization model, links the parameters of the aggregateand individual
price equations and develops a cost of adjustmentmodel of prices based on
rational expectations in which producers are aware of their true trading
opportunities and information in aggregate statistics concerningthe pre-
sent is available to them.
4. Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility
Production is essentially a dynamic phenomenon i.e., it takes time and
therefore is subject to uncertainty. Firms may take different steps to
reduce uncertainty. In a world of dynamic uncertainty firms will perform
Intertemporal arbitrage. The market variation is met only in part by
market adjustment in sales and the remainder is met by the firms internal
adjustment in inventory and to a lesser degree in production. In a world
of static certainty when the market is purely competitive through price and
entry and exit of firms the market adjusts to variation in demandand
supply. When the firm faces an uncertain market environment and a multi—
period decision horizon, price flexibility may not be a necessary condition
for efficient allocation of resources [Wu (1979)]. A stable price will
have certain benefits both to the sellers and buyers; it will cut the
search cost of buyers of the firm and eliminate the necessity for buyers to
accumulate precautionary inventory used to guard against price uncertainty.
These factors may encourage buyers to buy more at a given price or pay more— 22—
fora given quantity of goods in exchange for reductionin price uncer-
tainty. This could mean a higher demand for sellers.On theotherhand,
any price cutcouldbe construed in most industriesas an attempt to obtain
a larger market share whichwiLlbe resisted by rivals andmay lead to
lowerrevenuefor the seller.
Another way to mitigate the haphazard resultsof uncertainty in a
world where production takes time is theuse of contract [Davidson (1977)].
The wage Contract implicitorexplicitis the most pervasIve agreement in
the economy. If it wereconstantly revised and recontracted, the transac-
tion cost will be so high that it would
likely inhibit production in a
decentralized market economy. To a lesserdegree the same argument applies
to other types of costs andproducts.When contracts are taken intocon—
siderat ion then the past and future ofeconomic activities becomes part of
the economic process and provides theelement of inertia i.e., the
overlapping labor contract as a source ofinflexibility of prices. Because
if money wages are determined outsidethe theoretical market systemover
the forthcoming three year interval, thenprices will adjust to moneywages
rather the converse.
The inflexibility of wages arises froma number of factors. The most
widely accepted is based on the behavior of unionswhere collective
bargaining introduces lags in wageresponse of some Industries. In absence
of unions firms may want topay premium wages in order to have a queue of
available skilled labor and therefore the firmswill not change wages imme-
diately as labor conditions change [Wachter(1976)]. Also firms may
desire an ongoing relationship with theirlabor force, especially if the— 23 —
jobsareideosyncratic innature andrequire specific skills and training.
The wagesfor these type of jobs wiU he determined by the internal wage
structure and theshort—run market forces will he ignored in this situation.
5. Heterogeneity of Markets and Price Inertia
A number of models have been proposed which emphasizethediversity
and heterogeneity of different markets as the source of inertia of the
aggregateprice level. The basic notion is that the economyIs composed of
a variety- of markets with different characterIstics and differentrules of
behavior.Sticky prices may be a rational outcome in certain markets in
the economy which in turnmayimpart the price inertia at the aggregate
level.Arthur Okun, W. t'ordhaus and R. J. Gordon havediscussedvarious
aspects of how models ofheterogeneous markets may lead to price inertia at
theaggregate level.
The Okun [19811 model isbasedon a "contract—theoretic" frameworkand
states that in order to economize on transaction costs with one and other,
economic agents will trade repeatedly with each other. Wages and price
behavior are explained in a search theoretic framework. In markets with
heterogeneous products prices tend to be inflexible because information
about prices is difficult to obtain and there is a continuing relationship
between the buyer and seller. The transactions costs are very high and
price stability is in the interest of both parties. In these types of
markets called "customer markets" both customers and producers have an
interest in stable prices. The customers would like to avoid excessive
search cost and are willing to pay a premium to do business with customary— 24—
suppliers.Firms have an incentive in stable prices toencourage customers
to return using yesterday's prices as a guide. But ifpermanent changes in
demand and costs have accrued and both thecustomers and firms have this
knowledge, prices could change without inducing customersto do comparison
shopping. Price stability is considered as a service inOkun's model which
is a complete reversal of Means' model ofadministered prices noted
earlier. The auction or what we calledliquid markets clears instan-
taneously and there is no incentive to induce long termcontractual
arrangements, infrequent price changes and quantity rationing. Inmarkets
with homogeneous products information flowsrapidly and the market macha—
nism is impersonal.
Nordhaus [1976] elaborates further this line ofthinking. The economy
can be divided into "auction" and "administered" markets.In the auction
markets competitive supply and demand forcesprevail and prices are
flexible. In the administered markets eitherbuyers or sellers have signi-
ficant market power and one use of thatpower has been to restrain price
movements. Prices and wages are set In these marketson some principle of
"normal pricing" i.e., cyclical fluctuationsare largely removed In setting
prices and wages. The effect of demand onaggregate price will be fairly
weak and there will be an effect from whatNordhaus calls the "momentum
effect." Demand changes affect pricesthrough three channels: through the
mark up In the administered market pricesequation, through unemployment In
the wage equation and from "auction" market.The combination of these
forces due to nonhinearities are likely to beweak at low levels of demand
but high when the economy operates atcapacity. The "momentum effect" of— 25 —
currentand past wage and prices in the administered markets of the economy
dominatestheir short term movements. The effect of demand policies will
be small in the initial stage .but would be spread out over a long period.
The third effect comes from the auction prices which maybe due to such
factors as oil price increase, increases in commodity prices, changesIn
weather, speculation, etc.If these changes are significant, then as Bruno
and Sachs [19821 have shown, input price shocks can affect aggregate prices
significantly.
An elaborate model of price behavior is outlined by R. J. Gordon
[19811. No adjustment costs are formally included in the analysisbut the
emphasis is put on diversity of circumstance facingfirms in differnt
markets and the cost of communication and coordination through a complex
input—output network of relationships among firms.Firms may face diverse
sets of circumstances in various markets: they may havedistinct tech-
nologies, produce heterogeneous products, discoverinformation about
changes in their own demand and costs and the aggregatedemand and cost
changes with different degrees of certainty. The learning capacityof
firms are usually not the same [Frydman (1981)1 i.e., there may be long
lags in formation of expectations [Maccini (1981)1.What emerges In
Gordon's model is the crucial role of the local vs. aggregate componentsof
demand and costs i.e., the ratio of the variance of local to the sum of
variances of local and aggregate components of demand shift and the ratio
of the local to the sum of the local and aggregate components of costs.
These ratio's are likely to be zero in periods of war and hyperinflation
when there is extreme pressure for prices to change; the varianceof the— 26—
aggregatecomponents of demand and costs will dominate in suchperiods and
Individual prices respond immediatelyto changes in aggregate demand and
costs.
A further extension of the idea thatthe network of Input—output or
stages of production matter in pricing behavior offirms has been developed
recently by Blanchard [19831. Some of thesimplifying assumptions are that
production is instantaneous, alt goodsare perishable, input supply is an
increasing function of its real price,
output demand depends posItIvely on
real money balances andmoney is neutral and affects only the level of all
prices. Firms choose their relativeprices every two periods and their
prices depend on current and expectedinput prices for the next two
periods. Assuming rational expectations anduncertainty Blanchard shows
that if the firm's price decisions
are not completely synchronized the
price level will depend on three elements: theactual and expected past
input prices, the actual value andpast expectations of current Input pri-
ces and both past and current expectations ofinput prices. As the number
of stages of production increases thedependence of the price level on
input prices further in the past andexpected in the future. Price level
will react less and adjust moreslowly to changes in money if real input
prices are insensitive to market conditions.
Increase in money affects the
structure of prices; prices early in the chainof production move more and
adjust faster, prices further in the chainmove less and adjust more
slowly. When a nominal disturbance requiresa change in the price level
what will likely follow is a change inprices of a complex structure of
final goods, intermediate goods andinputs. These adjustments will not be— 27—
takencontinuously nor in the same manner in different markets or
industries. Thus the desynchrouizatiofl of individual pricedecision can
generate price level inertia observed at the aggregate economyor industry
level.
There is some empirical evidence that suggests that the responseof
prices by stage of process to a change in demanddiffer substantially. The
model of stage of process developed by Popkin [1977] links the movementsof
crude, intermediate and finished goods components ofthe WPI with each
other and with the CPI. The results of the twenty—one sector price model,
when viewed as a whole, suggest that it is in the primary andsemi—finished
goods industries, rather than in the finished goods producingand distri-
buting sectors, that changes in demand affect the relationshipbetween the
output and input prices. The initial responsein the finished goods
industries is to reduce output and not prices. Cutbacks in orders for
materials and supplies placed by these industries are often larger than
they would be if prices had been flexible. The fluctuationsin output are
much larger at the earlier stage than at the latter stage of productionand
also the ratio of price of output to the weighted price of inputs behave
not procyclically in the finished goods sectors while that forthe primary
and semi finished products it moves procyclically. In response to a cut-
back of orders from the finished product manufacturers, the prices in the
primary product manufacturing industries weaken. Suchweakness then feeds
forward to final demand prices, with a lag, affecting prices in all
finished manufacturing and service sectors. Thus, the amplitude of output
and price responses to changes in final demand vary considerably among dif—— 28—
ferentstages of production arid there is a dynamic relationship among the
response pattern through the input—output structure of the economy.
III. Asymmetrical Price Increase
We have noted that not only most prices have become less responsive to
decline in aggregate demand but they may also rise in a recession. What
can explain this perverse behavior? There are several lines of reasoning
for this phenomenon to occur.
Under the conditions of monopoly the traditional theoretical explana-
tion for rigidity of prices in the presence of contraction in demand is
based on the difference between short and long run price elasticity of
demand. Since the short—run elasticity of demand is less than thelong run
elasticity, and in many cases must be less than one. It implies that a
monopolist considering a price cut to deal with a temporary recession would
face a possibly negative marginal revenue compared to marginalrevenue it
would face in making general price policy. The natural conclusionseems to
be that optimal price policy in a recession would often be to holdprices
stable or to change them only in response to changes In long—run
expectations.
This reasoning has some relevance to the explanation of price inflexi-
bility during recessions of oligopolistic prices. Spence [1976] has
suggested the concept of market share equilibrium and showed that there
exists the set of market shares having the property that no firmcan
increase its profits if all others react by maintaining their market share.
In this framework market shares serve as basis of strategic interaction— 29—
amonglirms in oligopolistic industry. Suppose now that the fall in
industry demand affects proportionately all the firms so theycontinue to
be in the market share equilibrium. It is clear that If industry demand
becomes inelastic the firm would not find it profitable to lower their
prices given that other firms will react to maintain their marketshares.
Lowering of the price by individual may be considered by other firms as
"competitive" price cutting and lead to the breakdown of implicit collusive
agreement and benefits associated with such agreement. Moreover con-
siderable uncertainty will exist as to the true value of industry's price
elasticity of demand. Therefore, it is very likely that known benefits of
implicit collusion will outweight highly uncertain benefits of contemplated
price reduction. On the other hand if costs during the recessions because
of "momentum effect" build in past contracts rise, the firm will likely to
pass these prices without any danger of retaliation fromits competitors.
Cost increases are likely to be experienced by all the firms In the oligo—
polistic industry where firms are likely to follow a normal pricing deci-
sion rule with respect to prices of inputs and outputs.
Another rationale for asymmetric pricing behavior is suggested by
Kuran [19831. He argues that prices of monopolistic firms with
nonincreasing price elasticity of demand and nonincreasing marginal costs
can be relatively more rigid downward than upward. Such firms raise their
prices to a greater extent when they expect inflation, than they lower them
when they expect equivalent reduction in demand. In response to an
Increase in price level uncertainty these firms will increase their prices.
These results follow from the notion that the monopolist's loss is greater— 30—
fromcharging a price below themonopolyprice than the loss from charging
above it by a proportionally equivalent amount. A price cutmay trigger a
reaction from competitors while an increase in pricesmay not.
To show that relative prices variability can be linked to variation In
the rate of inflation require that prices respondasymmetrically to distur-
bances. If prices behave asymmetricaly in either direction theassociation
between relative prices and rate of inflation can be established andnot if
prices are equally sticky in recessionary and expansionary phases of the
business cycle. Fischer's [1982] results indicate that there isa strong
link between unanticipated inflation and relative pricevariability for
bothU.S.and Germany. There are weaker links between the variation of
relative prices and rate of inflation. Unanticipated inflationwas found
to affect relative price variability much more than a deflationsuggesting
support for the asymmetric price response hypothesis.
But why should many firms in the competitive industry raiseprices
when demand falls? The only conceivable circumstance is theperception of
the decrease in the short—run elasticity of demand coupled withincrease of
marginal costs of firms in the competitive industry. In such acase, If
properly perceived by individual firms the proper profit maximizing
response is the increase, not decrease in the price [Frydman and Nadiri
(1978)]. Since the firm contemplating the price change will be highly
uncertqin as to the price elasticity of demand for its product but it wilt
be able to observe the increases in its costs, it might decide to increase
its price. If all firms perceive the Situation in thisway the fall in
demand will be mostly reflected in the output changes.— 31—
Theoverall, conclusion from the above reasoning is that when contrac-
tion of demand is accompanied by increases in direct costs the rational
response of both competitive and oligopolistic firms might be to raise
prices. This phenomenon will be considerably strengthened, if the firms in
botholigopolistic and competitive industries expect the contraction in
demand to be temporary, while cost increases are perceived to be permanent.
It is also clear that due to the element of implicit collusion in oligopo—
listic industries the increase in prices should be more widely observed in
more concentrated industries.
An interesting explanation of this perverse behavior of prices is pro-
vided by Cagan [1979]. If the anticipated trend of prices is upward and
price changes over the cycle are the cyclical deviations from the trend,
then prices will rise in the recession, however, less than the trend. The
long trend in prices can he subject to rational expectations. This antici-
pation factor will be incorporated in contract prices of inputs or some
input supplies will be withheld from the market. Thus, the anticipated
rise in price trend can limit decline of prices in the recession and may
cause prices to rise if the anticipated trend is rising fast enough. But
the anticipated price trend will be revised by rational agents depending on
the severity and duration of current and past business cycles.
IV. International Competition and Pricing Behavior
In the previous sections we have examined a pricing behavior across
industries in the domestic economy. A number of the Industries considered
producegoods that aresold in theforeign nmrkets.In many industries— 32—
foreignfirms have a significant share of the domestic markets.Moreover,
many industries use inputs that are traded internationally. Therefore, the
developments In the world markets, trade patterns andcurrency fluctuations
have a potentially important role in understanding of thepricing adjust-
ment in domestic industries. Unfortunately, no systematic theoreticaland
empirical analysis of price formation seems to exist for industriespro—
ducing exportable or import—competing goods. Therefore, the discussion in
this section wilL necesarily be limited to few observationson the possible
significance of these issues.
We noted earlier that barriers to entry could playan important role
in pricing behavior of firms. Competition in the worldmarket could have
the same effect as entry of a competitor in the domesticeconomy. For
example, Wachtel and Adelsheim [1977] have argued that in U.S. automobile
industry foreign competition provides an extraordinarily intensecom-
petitive check on what had traditionally been a mature oligopoly with
routinized pricing behavior. Due to this competition,price increases for
domestically produced cars have been restrained and price markups In the
automobile industry have declined in recentyears.
Even though similar calculations have not been performed forother
Industries the potentially significant effect of importscan be inferred by
noting that between 1960 and 1970 imports increased in high concentration
industries by the following percentages: Machinery andtransportation
equipment —662percent; rubber tires and tubes —876percent; iron and
steel mill products —352percent. These developments suggest caution in
the use of concentration ratios as a basis forstudying price behavior— 33—
acrossindustries. In the presence of substantial volume of imports, the
concentration ratios might significantly overstate the degree of market
power or possibility of implicit price coordinationin domestic industries.
[Frydman and Nadiri (1978)].
As we noted earlier, material costs are generally very significant in
explaining industry price behavior. Since many of raw materials are
traded internationally, it is clear that the domestic prices will be
strongly affected by the conditions in the world commodity markets. Also,
the effect of changes in exchange rate in addition to having an effect on
Import prices, will have an effect on domestic prices of import competing
goods.
Some empirical results are available on the role played by changes in
import prices and particularly the recent increase in material prices.
Nordhaus and Shoven [1977] have decomposed the rate of Inflation of 58 sec-
tors in the U.S. economy during 1972—1974 into its components. They have
considered the effect of acceleration in agricultural prices, rise in
mining and domestic fuel prices, imports price increase, and Increase in
labor costs. Several results stand out: First, the contribution of these
components vary considerably in different sectors; In some Import prices
dominate, in a few the rise in agricultural prices stands out, while in
some others the labor cost increase seems to be the major component of the
sectoral inflation rates; second, about 85% of the inflation was explained
by the pass—through of hikes in the commodity prices and wages, suggesting
the dominance of the costs in prices behavior; third, there were shifts in
the composition of the inflation over the two years 1972—74. In the early— 34—
partsof the period wage increase was the majorcontributory factor to
inflation, while prices of agricultural products accounted for two third8
of the inflation in November 1972 to August 1973; importscontributed about
16% to Inflation in this period. In the last part of 1973—74period
imports dominated the picture. 36% of total inflation was due to rise In
import prices and the price rise of the domestic crude oil and naturalgas
contributed significantly to inflation in this period.
Grubb et al [1982J explore the causes of stagflation in 19 OECD
countries and estimate the contributrion of slowdown inproductivity
growth, the unfavorable trends in relative import prices and thehigher
level of unemployment. They show that in theaverage OECD country relative
import prices made inflation in 1980 5% higher than it would have beenif
import prices had continued their pre 1973 trend. Lowerproductivity
growth had art equal effect in raising Inflation. These two effectswere
offset by the effect of higher unemployment measuredas deviation from its
trend. Bruno and Sachs [1982] also have argued thatinput price shocks
can lead to decline in growth of output and productivity, realwages, and
capital accumulation. When real wages are sticky these effectsare greatly
magnified leading to greater unemployment and decline inoutput. With real
wage inertia profitability is reduced significantly by the rise in input
prices and investment tends to become sharply reduced. Theirempirical
analysis suggests that recent sharp increases in material prices has beena
ma)orcontributoryof the increase in therate of inflation in most of the
OECD countries. Since materials is a majorcomponent of the imports in
thesecountries, the exogeneous increase in prices of materials and oil— 35—
since1973 was one of the major factors in the stagflation of the Western
economics.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have looked at some empirical evidence on price
inflexibility and presented some of the theoretical bases for why price
stability in the face of a decrease in short run demand may be an outcome
of rational maximization behavior. The response of firms to uncertainty,
the cost of adjusting prices, the contents of the long—term contracts
(explicit or implicit) in the goods and input markets, the extent and
variability of excess demand may differ among firms and industries. The
structure of the Industry, the degree of heterogeneity of the products in a
market, the network of input—output relationship among industries, the
nature of international competition, the process of formation of expec-
tations shocks from monetary and fiscal policies and Input price increases,
all may Interact and create the ever changing environment of the firms.
There is a continual interplay of institutional forces, market arrangements
and cultural factors and customs that govern the behavior of firms with the
governmental policies and macroeconomic forces, which will result in price
rigidities in the short—run. These rigidities will evolve over time and
will vary across different markets, industries, or countries. In the long
run the Institutions and market arranginents will also change when they are
no longer useful and serve their purpose.
In the presence of the price rigidities, the conventional monetary and
fiscal restraint can achieve price stability at a high cost of high— 36—
unemployment.This would result from the momentum of built in lags in the
costs and if people form their expectations by extrapolating past rates of
inflation. The cost of restraining inflation could be fairly high as
recently documented by Gordon [1982b]. On the other hand there is con-
vincing evidence that monetary and fiscal restraints have been very suc-
cessful in reversing the inflationary spiral in hyper—inflations
experienced by a number of countries in the early 1920's (Sargent [1982]).
The cause of such hyper—inflations may have been the excessive increase of
money and peoples' expectations that the government will accommodate the
inflationary developments. To end the hyper—inflation the governments were
forced to adopt a dramatically new strategy of a coordinated set of poli-
cies. An abrupt change in government policies and an effective inforcement
of the new legislations were the prerequisites for ending the hyper—
inflations. Though there are not any specific estimates of costs of such
anti—inflationary policies, it seems they did not lead to any widespread
unemployment that are implied in the models discussed in this paper.
In hyper—inflationary situations the transaction costs of holding money
Is so high that all contracts expressed in money terms become excessively
burdensome and the length of contracts dramatically shrinks; the distortive
effects of high inflation on incentives could lead to disorientation of the
business and consumers, the distribution of income and wealth gets
distorted and finally the self generating nature of Inflationaryexpec-
tations become very much understood by the public and the government. In
such situations the government will get the mandate to follow dramatic
anti—inflationary policies to break the inflationary expectations and put— 37—
theeconomy on a stable course. However, at low rates of inflation a con-
sensus often does not exist for a decisive action. In democractic
societies, the governments will not have the ability to sustain anti—
inflationary policies for too long and with sufficient force to achieve
growth with stable prices. The central point to stress is that the ability
of governments to combat inflationary expectations is eridogenous in the
system. There is a nonlinear relationship between the costs of inflation,
the ability of the government to pursue effective anti—inflationary poli-
cies, and the public's acceptance of the needed adjustments.
What kind of policy options are open In an economy with moderate rates
of inflation which exhibits, in the short—run, price inflexibility for the
reasons described in this paper? This is a very difficult question and
would require considerable analysis and space beyond the scope of this
paper. A few such options can be mentioned here but only briefly. If the
price inflexibility Is partly due to Imperfect and costly information or
its uneven distribution and utilization then such a market failure can be
corrected with timely and relevant information provided by policy makers
and emergence of firms that could make the needed information available.
If the problem is partly due to overlapping wage contracts and institu-
tional rigidities in other markets, or if it Is due to disynchronised
nature of pricing decision, then the possibility of successes in the short—
run is not encouraging. Only a consistent policy targeted at the disaggre—
gated industry levels and sustained for a number of years might dampen the
effects of these structural forces. If the price inflexibility is partly
in response to uncertainty and inability to determine precisely the changes-38--
in aggregate demand, then governmentalpolicies can minimize potential distur--
bances by avoiding erratic and sizeable shifts inits monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. Government policies that lessen thedegree of concentration -in domestic
markets and encourage internationalcompetition may dampen the potential effects
of monopoly power on prices. But internationalagreements may also be required
to stabilize prices of inputs such as rawmaterials, which can exert significant
effect on the level of prices when the domesticprices are inflexible.
Promoting increase in productivity and technicalchange may be one of the impor-
tant ways to lower the rate of inflation and reduceprice inflexibility.
Further, the price structure of government services andthe effect of govern-
mental regulations on price behavior must beexamined carefully for they may
impart significant inflexibility to the price structure.— 39—
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